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ABSTRACT
This paper takes a closer look at EU crowdfunding platforms offering investment in renewable
energy (RES) projects, how they are exposed to and lead with investor risk. The platforms’
business model and the resulting risk types are analyzed, as well as their assessment, mitigation
and communication based on an in depth document review and on a survey taken among the
platform’s representatives. The resulting overview shows that RES-crowdfunding activity thrives
on stable long-term policy support schemes for small and medium scale projects, as well as on
comprehensive financial regulation that exempts crowdfunding from traditional financial service
regulatory obligations. When combining the offered financial instruments and underlying
remuneration of RES-projects, a considerable exposure to credit risk can be verified. Risk
awareness among platforms can be considered high. However, confidence in the investor’s
capability to deal with risk is high as well.
1. Introduction
Crowdfunding has presented itself as an alternative to
finance companies, non-profit organizations and projects
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, compensating
for credibility loss of traditional financial services [5, 17]
Over the same period Renewable energy (RES) projects
have been greatly affected by a funding gap that had its
origin in the financial crisis, but was widened by the
reduced policy support [6, 20] As a consequence,
crowdfunding initiatives have surged that couple support
for renewables by the public [19], the historical low
interest on savings accounts [2], the need for financing
felt by RES-project promotors due to decreasing public
support [8, 20] and lacking private finance [21] or the
risk-return characteristics of smaller RES projects that do
not fit traditional lending conditions [4]. 
This paper will (1) identify the risks that rise from
the financial mechanics used by the crowdfunding
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platforms offering RES-projects and (2) give an
overview of how platforms assess, mitigate and
communicate the risks that can affect their investors.
Therefore, three questions have to be answered:
(1) which are the business models used, (2) how are
these models exposed to risks that lead to credit/default
risk for the crowdfunding investor and (3) how are
platforms assessing/mitigating/communicating those
risks? The document review will permit us (1) to detect
significant relations between the number of platforms,
the type of projects and the given RES-regulation in
each country, thus laying bare implications for liquidity,
credit or default risk to the crowdfunding investor, (2) to
identify the financial regulatory framework in which
RES-crowdfunding platforms operate, the financial
instruments they offer, with the adopted regulation as a
benchmark for the level of protection.
The paper is divided in the following sections:
Section 2 will give background on RES-crowdfunding
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activity in the EU, the business models crowdfunding
platforms use and the perceived risk of crowdfunding
investors. Section 3 lays out the methodology for
breaking down those business models and conducting
the survey on risk among the platforms representatives.
Section 4 gives an overview of the results of both
document review and survey. In Section 5, conclusions
and suggestions for future research are presented.
2. Background
Crowdfunding platforms offering RES-projects are a
relatively new phenomenon, with the Dutch pioneer De
Windcentrale going back to 2010. In majority these
platforms rely on equity and debt they collect from
the crowd to finance the projects [7, 9, 14, 20].The
energy production of the funded RES-projects generates
steady cash flows coming from policy support schemes,
energy sales or energy saving costs. The projects use a
variety of financial instruments such as loans, bonds or
securities to materialize the financial return for their
investors. As future cash flow is feeding the investment
return, ‘robustness and stability of cash flow’ works as a
proxy for the liquidity, default and credit risk that
weighs upon the investor [15]. Cash flow robustness is
determined by the policy and financial de-risking
instruments that set out the frame (in time and amount)
for the RES-project revenues [1, 15, 16]. These policy
schemes now face uncertainty because governments
have been scaling back the initially generous support in
the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis.
Meanwhile the European State Aid Guidelines require
that renewable energy should be progressively exposed
to market competition. As a consequence, an overall
tendency of fading out or cutting back Feed-in-Tariffs
(FiT) can be verified, thus creating pockets of legal
uncertainty [1, 3, 10, 11, 15, 18]. Therefore, focus will
lie on the transfer from the project’s business/policy risk
to the crowdfunder’s credit/default risk.
As crowdfunding models offering financial return
attract investors with financial motivations, they show an
increasing risk/return intensity [14, 20]. This leads to a
‘risk paradox’ in the RES-crowdfunding environment.
The RES-projects that serve as an underlying asset
are highly complex to evaluate due to regulation
and technical viability assessment [4, 20], while
crowdfunding platforms typically attract non-specialist
investors, thus creating an additional gap where low
preparedness stands against high complexity. Moreover
there are indications that the financial, but also cause-
related motivation of RES-crowdfunding investors 
[14, 20, 22] may relate positively to perceived risk. The
particular motivation and perceived risk of the RES-
crowdfunding investor has to be weighed against the
crowdfunding platform’s exposure, awareness, mitigation
and communication of risk, in order to draw any
conclusion on its attitude towards investor risk.
3. Methodology
In order to break down each business model in its
respective regulatory frame, a qualitative field study [8]
was conducted, consisting of a document review and a
survey. Information was obtained via an in depth review
of all information made available by active RES-
crowdfunding platforms in the EU, breaking down the
business models into; type of RES-project (technology
and remuneration), financial regulation of platform
activity and financial instruments (type and
characteristics). Simultaneously a survey was taken
among platform representatives (C-level) on their
attitude towards risk. The sample frame was established
at 23 active crowdfunding platforms offering RES-
projects on December 31st 2016, in both mature
(volume, number of platforms, years of activity) and
upcoming markets; of those 10 responded the survey. 
These 23 platforms most likely do not coincide with all
active platforms offering RES-projects, as the
crowdfunding market is still an early stage there is a
constant flow of new platforms, platforms that cease
activity or that stop offering RES projects. The
sample selection is based on crossing data of
databases such as crowdsurfer.com, eurocrowd.org
(European Crowdfunding Network), citizenergy.eu,
crowdfundres.eu, recrowdfunding.eu, crowdfunding.de
and the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance.
Excluded were one off crowdfunding campaigns by
project promotors or energy companies, as well as
cooperatives and community energy projects, mainly
because they use fundamentally different business models. 
The survey is based on the same dual approach,
focusing on both underlying asset and the financial
instruments that are used. At RES-project-level
representatives are questioned about impact and
probability of nine risk types affecting the project [6]. In
regard to the financial instruments, the survey questions
the platform’s compliance and attitude towards risk
mitigation and communication.
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4. Results
First an overview of RES-crowdfunding activity is given
(number of platforms, age, volume, per capita volume),
then a relationship is established between platform
activity and regulation. Finally risks resulting from the
platform’s business models are reviewed.
4.1. The EU RES-crowdfunding market in numbers
Out of the 23 active platforms, seven are German
(30.4%), five are Dutch (21.7%), four are French
(17.4%) and two Austrian (8.7%). The UK, Sweden,
Belgium and Finland each have one platform (4.3%).
Germany and the Netherlands have the eldest active
platforms, with German platforms counting on average
1,721 days of activity and the Dutch 1,542 days.
Germany has the largest volume of crowdfunded
RES-projects (61,744,080 euro), followed by the UK
(49,340,000 euro — including the projects from the
Trillion Fund that stopped funding RES in 2015) and the
Netherlands (42,968,648 euro). At a distance come
France (14,982,875 euro), Austria (3,160,046 euro),
Finland (889,992 euro), Sweden (440,000 euro) and
Belgium (150,000 euro). When considering RES-
crowdfunded volume per capita the Netherlands clearly
come first (2.52 euro/person), then Germany
(0.77 euro/person), the UK (0.75 euro/person), Austria
(0.37 euro/person) and France (0.23 euro/person). The
Netherlands have two major platforms each representing
37% of total volume, with the other 26% split evenly
over the remaining three platforms. In contrast,
Germany and France count each one platform that
represents respectively 72% and 75% of the total RES-
crowdfunded volume. The Netherlands thus stand out as
the most mature RES-crowdfunding market, having the
most and the eldest platforms, as well as the most
equalized market and the highest volume per capita.
4.2. Relation between regulation and RES-
crowdfunding activity
4.2.1. RES-policy support-RES-crowdfunding activity
Countries with the most RES-crowdfunding platforms
have a RES-policy based on premium tariff and/or
Feed-in-tariffs (FiT), which enables and guarantees
long term foreseeable cash flows necessary for the
investment return. Platforms in those countries in
majority offer RES-projects based on small to medium
scale solar PV systems (74% of all platforms) and wind
turbines (52% of platforms), selling produced
electricity to the grid. In comparison, energy efficiency
projects (CHP –in 17% of platforms, relighting — 17%,
insulation — 9%) are less frequent as underlying asset.
The Dutch and German platforms rely on market
premium schemes that are based on market-oriented
tender procedures, in order to cover the costs of (non-
mature) RES-technologies and ensure their
profitability. While being exposed to a market of
electricity producers, the premium tends towards a
minimum risk premium. Coinciding with the largest
RES-crowdfunding markets, the stable market
premiums of Germany and the Netherlands emerge as
the policy instrument that most favors platform activity
(Table 1). Policy changes towards a market-oriented
market premium — as in France — have not hampered
RES-crowdfunding development. While policy
uncertainty (UK) or abruptly scaling back (Spain) have
an immediate negative effect on activity.
4.2.2. Financial regulation- RES-crowdfunding activity
RES-crowdfunding platforms in the Netherlands all
operate under different regulatory frameworks and have
benefitted from a tolerant regulatory environment.
German platforms initially chose lightly regulated
instruments that fitted their purposes (subordinated
loans), but were forced to adopt a heavier framework
when those loans were considered investment products.
The UK has regulated lending based crowdfunding
under the existing regime for financial services, forcing
platforms towards a compliance with the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). France has
created a specific status for investment based platforms,
but nonetheless the larger ones prefer a MiFID
authorization. Austria, Belgium, Finland and Sweden
show a regulatory landscape with non-specific or
unfinished regulation not favoring RES-crowdfunding
(Table 2).
4.2.3. Business model/amount of fees-RES-regulation
A review of RES-regulation/support schemes and the
amount of the management and funding success fees
reveals that platforms relying on cash flows from older
FiT-policies, practice lower management and success
fees than platforms relying on market premium or
energy saving costs. There are some exceptions, with
Ecrowd (ES) practicing the lowest fees on the market
(2-4%+1-1.5% annually) in spite of having no access to
support.
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4.3. Risk types surging from the business models
used by RES-crowdfunding platforms
4.3.1. RES-regulation and risk
Eight platforms (four DE, three FR and one UK) have
RES-projects alimented by FiT-schemes, making these
projects the least exposed to business risk. With the
major RES-crowdfunding markets (NL, DE, UK, FR)
tending to market premium schemes and phasing out
FiT’s, business risk is likely to rise. Four platforms offer
projects relying on cash flows only from sales, exposing
them to a comparative higher business and default risk. 
Also, the type of financial instrument determines the
level of credit risk for the investor. Nine platforms (39%)
offer lower risk instruments such as secured business
loans, bonds/debentures and senior bond loans.
Differences exist across countries and even within the
same platform; Dutch senior bond loans and secured
business loans are offered next to unsecured business
loans. The bonds issued by the projects on the French
platforms are not secured; they are senior to shareholders
and junior to the bank. Finally, the subordinate profit
participating loans that are used by six German RES-
crowdfunding platforms, put crowdfunders junior to all
other company/project-creditors, exposing them to huge
credit risk. 
Knowing that both underlying RES-remuneration and
financial instrument type are steering credit risk, data
crossing shows that four platforms (17%) are combining
low risk FiT-support with low risk instruments, while
another four benefit from FiT/market premium offering
higher risk instruments (Table 3).
Overall 13 platforms (56.5%) include additional bank
financing. Especially the French platforms (75%) highly
rely on extra bank financing; with the same three
platforms offering complex products (portfolio,
refinancing existing projects or crowdfunding as a part of
a complex debt structure). German (57%) and Dutch
(50%) platforms show average additional bank financing,
with only two Dutch and two German platforms offering
complex products. When it comes to risk, bank/third party
financing is a sword that cuts both edges. It can be an
extra guarantee for the project quality — as additional due
diligence is carried out — but when investors are junior to
bank financing (as with the bond-type used by three
French platforms), they are exposed to credit risk.
Nine platforms (39%) offer instruments that are
transferable. Only three of them have a secondary
Table 1: Remuneration feeding return of RES-projects/Number of platforms per country
Name platform Country Feed-in-tariff Market premium Energy saving cost Product sales
Trine SE/UK* X
Abundance UK X X X
GreenCrowding DE X X
Bettervest DE X X X
Greenvesting DE X X
Wiwin DE X X
GreenXMoney DE X X
LeihDeinerUmweltGeld DE X X X
Econeers DE X X X
Lumo FR X X
WeDoGood FR X
Lendosphère FR X X X
Enerfip FR X X X
Windcentrale NL X X
Greencrowd NL X X X
WeShareSolar NL X X
DuurzaamInvesteren NL X X
OnePlanetCrowd NL X
Conda AT X
GreenRocket AT X
EccoNova BE X
ECrowd! ES X X
Invesdor SF X
*Trine works under an UK/FCA authorization, source: Author’s own construction based on platform’s websites
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market where they can be traded on, thus exposing the
investors to liquidity risk. Finally, all platforms but
TRINE, base their revenues on the funded capital
(success fee) and some kind of management fee for the
duration of the project. Depending largely on the
funding success of the project promotor, platforms do
not depend directly on the project’s performance and are
thus exposed to moral hazard.
4.4. The platform’s attitude towards risk
The risks that platforms judge most probable to affect
their RES-projects are; finance risk (60%), technical and
management risk (50%) and administrative risk (40%).
Finance risk affects both smaller and bigger platforms,
all kind of debt instruments (bonds, debentures and
(un)secured business loans), but is more frequent among
platforms that are not/no longer benefitting from FiT-
support schemes. Also, platforms in the large
crowdfunding markets such as France, Germany and the
Netherlands, think a sudden change in policy is highly
unlikely. Even after the Brexit vote the UK platform
Abundance calls a market design and regulatory risk
‘unthinkable’ and a sudden policy change ‘unlikely’.
As for the impact of these risks, the technical and
management risk is considered by a majority to have a
considerable (60%)-very high (20%) impact. Financing
risk (30% considerable impact and 30% very high)
emerges as the most likely risk with the highest
estimated impact on the project. Whereas policy design,
market design and sudden regulatory changes are
considered of considerable/very high impact by half of
the platforms (30% considerable, 20% very high).
When it comes to risks that affect the investor,
platforms are confident that fraud, loss or theft of client
data will not happen (80% calling it ‘unlikely’).
Interestingly 70% consider a loss of invested capital (all
or part) unlikely, while only the Swedish platform
specializing in projects located in developing countries
Table 2: Authorization of platform activity/Number of platforms per country
Authorization
Domestic for services
bespoke and activities
regime in relation to Authorization
under MiFID non-MiFID outside the
Authorization Art. 3 financial MiFID
Name platform Country under MiFID exemption instruments framework
Trine SE/UK* X
Abundance UK X
GreenCrowding DE X
Bettervest DE X
Greenvesting DE X
Wiwin DE X
GreenXMoney DE X
LeihDeinerUmweltGeld DE X
Econeers DE X
Lumo FR X
WeDoGood FR X
Lendosphère FR X
Enerfip FR X
Windcentrale NL X
Greencrowd NL X
ZonnepanelenDelen NL X
DuurzaamInvesteren NL X
OnePlanetCrowd NL X
Conda AT X
GreenRocket AT X
EccoNova BE X
ECrowd! ES X
Invesdor SF X
Sources: Author’s own construction based on survey, (ESMA 2015), platforms’ websites 
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and a German platform call a default risk ‘probable’.
About loss of interest there is no consensus, with 40%
saying it is ‘probable’ — against 50% calling it ‘unlikely’.
All 23 platforms conduct a form of due diligence
before accepting RES-projects to be published for
offering, making it the most important risk mitigation
instrument. The most complete due diligence
(project/promotor/regulation) is carried out by seven
platforms. Among this group, four mitigate risk
upfront beyond compliance obligations. These
platforms operate under four different authorization
categories. Two of them (DE-UK) have projects
relying on FiT-schemes and all have projects
benefitting from market premiums (DE-UK-NL),
among them both complex portfolio products and
simple subordinated loans based on one project. When
it comes to credit and liquidity risk only the investor is
exposed to, we find that of three platforms offering
higher risk instruments (subordinated participatory
loans, unlisted shares), only one mitigates beyond
compliance. All platforms communicate risk upfront,
five out of ten platforms make available information of
which the content goes beyond compliance. Within this
group, three are mitigating risk beyond compliance,
resulting in 30% of platforms that are outperforming
the rules on both aspects. When compared to the fairly
high confidence of platforms regarding risks that affect
the investor, we could state a possible conflict of
interest arises.
Comparing results of a 2013 global Environmental
Awareness Index (EIA) [12] and the latest Yale
Environmental Performance Index [13], poorly
performing countries (DE-NL) seem to have a more
environmental aware population, that in turn is more
willing to crowdfund RES-projects. Or, as is shown by
the UK and France, there is no apparent link between
environmental awareness and RES-crowdfunding
activity, confirming the financial motive as the most
probable. The survey results confirm this complex
investor profile, with 90% of platforms calling their
investors’ motives both ‘financial’ and ‘cause-
related’. When it comes to investors’ competence,
70% of platforms think they deal with ‘well informed
investors’ (against 20% poorly informed) and people
‘capable to deal with risk (against 20% vulnerable
to risk).
Table 3: Remuneration feeding return/type of financial instruments/country
Energy
saving Market Secured Bonds Unsecured Subordinate Royal-
Country Sales cost premium FiT loans debentures loans loans Shares ties
SE/UK* X X X X
UK X X X X
DE X X X
DE X X X X
DE X X X
DE X X X
DE X X X X
DE X X X X
DE X
FR X X X
FR X X
FR X X X X
FR X X X X X
NL X X X
NL X X X X X
NL X X X
NL X X X
NL X X X X
AT X X
AT X X X
BE X X
ES X X X X
SF X X
Sources: Author’s own construction based on survey, platforms’ websites
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5. Conclusions and future research
Stable market premium schemes emerge as the policy
instrument that most favors platform activity. Germany
and the Netherlands have been identified as the markets
with the eldest and the most platforms, as well as the
largest crowdfunded volumes. Both countries have
stable market premium schemes in place. In contrast,
policy uncertainty (UK) or abruptly scaling back (Spain)
have an immediate negative effect on activity. The
overview shows that there is a predominance of small to
medium scale solar PV systems and wind turbines that
benefit from policy support schemes. Survey-results
showed that financing risk is considered more probable
by platforms offering projects that no longer benefit
from the — long term, predictable — Feed-in-tariffs
(FiT). 
Comparing the evolution of financial regulation of
crowdfunding, it shows that a loose financial regulatory
framework leads to a range of business models and
financial instruments (NL), while a more specific
framework tends to reduce RES-crowdfunding to one
business model/one instrument (DE). Restrictions on
crowdfunding (FR) or levelling it next to traditional
financial services (UK), tend to force platform adopting
MiFID in order to enter the level playing field.
Business and credit risk affecting the RES-
crowdfunding investor are highly dependent on the
remuneration/support scheme of the underlying project.
With the phasing out of FiT and decreasing of market
premium, business risk is expected to increase. Only one
in five platforms offer RES-projects combining low risk
FiT-support with low risk instruments. Thus, credit risk
exposure for investors can be considered high, making
platforms dependent on their mitigation policy to reduce
risk. Platforms seem to be aware they are offering a high-
risk investment. Mitigation through due diligence is
generalized, even when the process is far from uniform.
Confidence in their business models is high, with a
minority calling default or even credit risk for the
investor probable. The dispersion in attitude towards risk
shows that platforms in general are not dealing with the
‘risk paradox’. Possibly they are overstretching the
crowdfunders’ capability to deal with the risk they are
actually exposed to, a situation from which conflicts of
interest can arise. Future research should explore how
perceived risk of crowdfunding investors relates to actual
risk, including project size, RES-remuneration/support
and financial instruments, ideally resulting in risk
modelling that is adaptable to particular business models.
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